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Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of political discretion and corruption 
on firm creation rates, distinguishing between formal and informal 
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opportunistic behaviour increases uncertainty and risks for entrepreneurial 
activities. Corruption also has a negative influence on formal entrepreneurship, 
as it increases the costs of the procedures required to create and manage the 
company with no assurance that the other party will fulfil the agreement. 
Regarding informal entrepreneurship, our results show that the negative impact 
of corruption also applies to non-formalised firms. 
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1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship has been pointed out by several authors as one of the key components 
in economic growth and development at the macro level (Agarwal et al., 2007; Baumol, 
2004; Baumol and Strom, 2007; Carsroud and Cucculelli, 2014), and closely linked to 
innovation, productivity growth, competitiveness, employment creation and personal 
success at the more micro level (Grilo and Thurik, 2005). 
While micro studies of entrepreneurs proliferate, Dreher and Gassebner (2013) point 
out that cross-country differences in entrepreneurship rates at the national level have 
received relatively less attention in the literature. At the national level, much of the 
variation in entrepreneurial activity remains unexplained if only economic variables are 
considered (Freytag and Thurik, 2007; Uhlaner and Thurik, 2007). As Acs et al. (2008) 
and Urbano and Alvarez (2014) emphasise, the role of institutions is a critical area  
of study to understand entrepreneurship across countries. Institutions interact with 
individuals and organisations by providing the rules of the game and by signalling which 
actions and behaviours are acceptable (North, 1990; Peng and Heath, 1996). 
Baumol (1990) and Sobel (2008) suggest that entrepreneurship greatly depends on 
the quality of institutions. However, as Dutta et al. (2013) argue, most studies analyse 
only government stability regarding which political party is in power when it is in fact 
the effectiveness and predictability of the judicial system, the enforcement of contracts, 
the protection of property rights, and the existence of limits to possible opportunistic 
behaviour by the government to transfer and appropriate wealth through regulation, 
which determine transaction costs and the level of uncertainty faced by entrepreneurs 
(Aidis et al., 2010). Using the terminology proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), 
these institutions of private property are essential for investment incentives and 
successful economic performance. When the institutions of private property are lacking, 
absent or concentrated in the hands of a small elite, they become extractive, rather than 
facilitative, and discourage investment with detrimental impact on aggregate performance.  
Consequently, we contribute to the body of literature that focuses on the impact  
of institutions on entrepreneurship (Baughn et al., 2006; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009;  
Acs et al., 2008; Estrin et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2015) by investigating 
the impact of two types of extractive institutions, namely political discretion and 
corruption, on entrepreneurial rates, both formal and informal. As Anokhin and Schulze 
(2009) claim, the impact of corruption and cross-national rates of entrepreneurship has 
received scant attention in the literature. Moreover, while previous studies have analysed 
the effect on entrepreneurship of several institutional indicators such as the economic 
freedom or the protection of property rights (see for instance Aidis et al., 2010 or Urbano 
and Alvarez, 2014), to the best of our knowledge no study has previously analysed the 
specific role of political discretion.  
Further, in order to offer a finer-grained analysis of the importance of institutions  
on entrepreneurship, we aim to disentangle the effects on formal entrepreneurship, 
comprising legally-registered firms in a country (Klapper et al., 2007), and informal 
entrepreneurship, comprising non-formalised firms that largely remain outside regulation 
(Nyström, 2008). Given that entrepreneurs in developed countries tend to operate mainly 
within the formal economy, and taking into account the difficulty of obtaining data  
and calculating variables to reliably quantify the weight of the informal economy,  
most studies have focused so far on formal entrepreneurship (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 
2006; Bruton et al., 2008; Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014). Nevertheless, it must be 
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acknowledged that the informal economy exists and plays a relevant role virtually 
everywhere (Webb et al., 2013), especially in developing countries (Fiess et al., 2010).  
Informal entrepreneurship is precisely one of the factors of greatest weight in the 
informal economy (ILO, 2002). Formal and informal entrepreneurship often have distinct 
characteristics and institutional determinants (Webb et al., 2009; Jimenez et al., 2015). 
Thus, this work also contributes to the literature on entrepreneurship by distinguishing 
between the impact that political discretion and corruption have on formal and informal 
entrepreneurship. In particular, our results show that both political discretion and 
corruption increase the potential for opportunism by government officials, thereby 
adversely affecting costs and uncertainty, and discouraging formal entrepreneurship. In 
addition, our analyses demonstrate that corruption has a negative influence on informal 
entrepreneurship as well, showing that the pernicious effects of corruption apply to both 
the formal and informal sectors.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section includes the 
literature review and develops the hypotheses about the impact of political discretion and 
corruption on the rates of both formal and informal entrepreneurship. The third section 
describes the methodology used in the empirical part of the paper, detailing the 
dependent, independent, and control variables, as well as the models and their empirical 
properties. The fourth section presents the results and describes the robustness tests. 
Finally, the fifth section draws the main conclusions and discusses limitations and 
possible future lines of research. 
2 Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 The impact of political discretion and  
corruption on the rates of formal entrepreneurship 
Political discretion refers to the ability of the government to unilaterally modify the 
“rules of the game”: that is, the rules governing the various aspects that affect the 
behaviour and performance of firms, such as tariffs, conditions for entry into the sector, 
taxes, etc. (Henisz, 2000; García-Canal and Guillén, 2008; Fernández-Méndez et al., 
2015). When political discretion is high, rule by law is substituted for rule of law. 
Political discretion often translates into political risk. Political risk maybe manifested 
indirectly though, for example, forced renegotiation of previously agreed conditions.1 
Lately, however, some governments have returned to direct measures in the form of 
nationalisation or expropriation, such as the expropriation of YPF to the Spanish 
company Repsol by the Argentine government, or that of the subsidiary of Red Eléctrica 
de España in Bolivia (Jimenez et al., 2014).  
According to the bargaining power approach, a company enjoys its most 
advantageous position in dealing with the local government when it negotiates the terms 
of entry before the investment is materialised. Nevertheless, once the investment takes 
place, an important shift occurs in the relative bargaining power between the company 
and the government owing to the existence of sunk costs or the obsolescence of their 
technological or managerial capabilities (Vernon, 1971; Kobrin, 1987). Depending on the 
evolution of relative bargaining power of the firm and the needs of the government, the 
latter may decide to appropriate the revenues generated by the company. Therefore, firms 
tend to avoid investing in those locations with higher political discretion, where the 
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authorities find few or no obstacles to unilaterally modify the terms agreed with the 
company (Henisz 2000; Henisz and Zelner, 2001; Henisz and Zelner, 2002). 
While most studies have examined the influence of political discretion in foreign 
investment decisions (García-Canal and Guillén, 2008; Jimenez, 2010; Jimenez and 
Delgado, 2012; Jimenez et al., 2014; Fernández-Méndez et al., 2015), the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour by the government also extends to domestic and entrepreneurial 
firms in the country. Sometimes, when the government aims to target a few companies 
only to blame for the country’s economic problems, local firms may be less exposed 
because subsidiaries of foreign companies are typically used as “scapegoats” (Davies, 
1981). However, when the government actions affect the whole sector, local companies 
can be even more disadvantaged by not being able to resort, as foreign multinational 
companies can, to the governments of their countries of origin to solicit support and 
diplomatic pressure to compensate for damages. Furthermore, given their size and 
international flexibility (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Song, 2013), foreign companies 
may rely on instruments of protection that are not within the reach of the majority of local 
businesses, such as insurance, transfer pricing, or even the development of political 
capabilities that allow them to gain competitive advantages in environments characterised 
by high levels of political risk (Baron, 1995; Wan, 2005; Lawton et al., 2013).  
Weingast (1995) and Estrin et al. (2013) underline the relevance of government 
constraints on entrepreneurship by ensuring the protection and stability of property 
rights. Accordingly, political discretion can be considered a deterrent to the creation of 
new formal business since it increases the unpredictability of applicable regulations 
thereby pushing up compliance costs and impacting negatively profitability (Levie and 
Autio, 2008, p.13). It also reduces potential entrepreneurs’ trust as the credibility of 
policies and commitments made by governments diminishes (Webb et al., 2013).  
The higher level of arbitrariness discourages entrepreneurship and innovation (Aidis  
et al., 2010). Besides, the negative repercussions on the fulfilment of contracts, the 
appropriation of returns, the security of property rights and the protection of investors 
increase the cost of capital (Estrin et al., 2013), transaction costs and uncertainty 
(Baumol, 1990; Dutta et al., 2013). Since these weaker and more unreliable institutions 
may influence the expected return of entrepreneurial activities, potential entrepreneurs 
are less likely to undertake them and may instead channel their efforts toward other types 
of activities (Hodler, 2009; Aidis et al., 2010). These arguments lead us to formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: “Greater political discretion has a negative impact on the rate of formal 
entrepreneurship.” 
Another fundamental aspect of the institutional quality of a country that may play  
a critical role in its rates of entrepreneurship is the level of corruption (Dreher and 
Gassebner, 2013; Estrin et al., 2013). As Anokhin and Schulze (2009) emphasise, 
corruption plays a pivotal role on the relationship between entrepreneurship, innovation 
and economic prosperity. Corruption may be defined as the abuse of power for private 
gain, and it includes the payment of bribes, favouritism or improper use of influence, or 
irregular payments in public contracts (World Bank, 2000). While corruption may have a 
“greasing” effect (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) by avoiding costs and speeding up procedures 
in environments where the institutional quality is poor (Leff, 1964; Olson, 1993; Egger 
and Winner, 2005), most of the literature emphasises that corruption increases the costs 
and uncertainty for companies (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000a; Wei, 2000b; Brouthers et al., 
2008). Thus, corruption is a sort of an informal tax for the entrepreneur. In addition, 
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Mauro (1998) points out that a higher level of corruption causes public spending to be 
used inefficiently, resulting in public investment in unproductive sectors that do not 
favour the growth and efficiency of the productive sectors. Similarly, Méon and Sekkat 
(2005) highlight the negative impact of corruption on economic growth, especially in 
those countries where governance quality is poor.  
Corruption discourages entrepreneurship and investments in innovation as it increases 
the risk that entrepreneurs will not be able to appropriate the profits or rents to which 
they are entitled (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). In addition, corruption may also be 
detrimental for entrepreneurship as it reduces growth aspirations (Vorley and Williams, 
2015) and discourages potential entrepreneurs unwilling to engage in corrupt behaviour 
(Aidis et al., 2010). As a shared informal social norm, corruption makes entrepreneurs 
operate at a disadvantage compared to established incumbents who have already 
implemented strategies and contacts to mitigate its negative effects (Estrin et al., 2013). 
The use of corruption does not ensure total protection for the one who pays a bribe. 
Given that this is an illegal activity, it may be difficult to ensure that the agreed 
conditions are fulfilled (Méon and Weill, 2010). Since no competent authority exists to 
enforce the fulfilment of what has been agreed upon, opportunistic behaviour is 
encouraged, especially in the case of the one who receives the bribe. In fact, and contrary 
to the argument of corruption as a “greasing” effect, Bardhan (1997) points out that the 
existence of corruption does not necessarily mean that costs can be avoided or that 
required procedures to create and set up a formal business can be accelerated. For 
instance, he cites the case of an Indian official who claims that he is unsure whether he 
can speed up a procedure, but who is certain that he can stall it. This example illustrates 
that corruption simply brings uncertainty and additional risk to transactions required for a 
formal entrepreneurship. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: “A higher level of corruption has a negative impact on the rate of formal 
entrepreneurship.” 
2.2 The impact of political discretion and corruption on the rates of  
informal entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship has attracted scholarly interest for decades, but recently studies  
have started to pay attention not only to formal but also to informal and illegitimate 
activities as these other types of entrepreneurship do also play a crucial role in multiple 
sectors and economies (Webb et al., 2009; Fiess et al., 2010, ILO, 2002). As previously 
stated, informal entrepreneurship refers to firms that are not registered and largely  
remain outside regulation (Nyström, 2008). It is important to underline that informal 
entrepreneurship refers to illegal (as specified by laws and regulations) but not 
illegitimate (as specified by norms, values and beliefs) entrepreneurial activities.2 As 
Webb et al. (2009) point out, means and ends in the informal economy may be illegal, 
but they are considered legitimate by large groups in the society. According to these 
authors, illegal and illegitimate entrepreneurial activities belong to the “renegade 
economy”, not to the informal economy. Informal entrepreneurial activities exist in what 
is considered the grey economy and, while illegal, maybe tolerated by government 
officials as they provide jobs and stability to low income families. 
Despite having some factors in common, such as fulfilling a market need or  
requiring entrepreneurial personalities, formal and informal entrepreneurship are 
different and have some different determinants (Webb et al., 2009; Jimenez et al., 2015). 
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As noted earlier, political discretion increases the risk for entrepreneurs as officials may 
act opportunistically. As uncertainty increases, incentives for creating formal enterprises 
are reduced, which can lead to entrepreneurial activities being conducted outside the law. 
By doing so, entrepreneurs can reduce their exposure to the risk of harmful policy 
changes or expropriation from governments (Feige, 1999; Webb et al., 2013).  
While private property institutions should provide stability and support for 
entrepreneurs and their business, extractive industries do the opposite, encouraging 
entrepreneurs to go underground. Political discretion weakens the third-party 
enforcement of formal institutions (North, 1990). When formal institutions are weak, 
entrepreneurs are encouraged to exploit recognised opportunities in the informal 
economy (Webb et al., 2009). 
When political discretion represents a serious threat to formal activities, the informal 
sector may be a strategy of last resort for entrepreneurs to start a business that would 
otherwise not be created (Günther and Launov, 2012). By carrying out the activity on an 
informal basis, the company is less subject to changing regulations, it can modify its 
operations with greater flexibility and adapt to new circumstances without the needed 
permits or other requirements. The company can also be easily dissolved, lowering  
the exit costs. Taking into account these advantages of informal entrepreneurship  
over formal enterprise in the light of political discretion, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: “Greater political discretion has a positive impact on the rate of informal 
entrepreneurship.” 
Following a similar logic, it is possible to devise a possible positive impact of corruption 
on the rates of informal entrepreneurship. By carrying out the activity in an informal 
manner, entrepreneurs can avoid, to some extent, the higher costs that paying bribes 
entail and keep flexibility to adapt, relocate or close down (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000a; 
Wei, 2000b; Brouthers et al., 2008). Uncertainty regarding whether the necessary official 
permits will be obtained to start running a formal activity are also avoided (Bardhan, 
1997). As in the case of political discretion, the deterrent that corruption means for 
formal entrepreneurship can transform into an incentive for informal entrepreneurship as 
an alternative to conduct an entrepreneurial activity that would not otherwise be started 
(Günther and Launov, 2012). Thus, despite many entrepreneurs favouring the formal 
economy owing to the security of property rights, the costs imposed by corruption, both 
in terms of money, time and managerial resources, may force them to operate informally 
as the only option for earning a livelihood (Webb et al., 2013).  
The informal economy may also require corruption. Corruption may actually be 
needed to maintain informal activities. As Webb et al. (2009) underline, bribery affects 
the self-interest of formal institutional agents and, as a consequence, undermines the 
efforts to control deviant behaviours. Countries where corruption is relatively common or 
accepted may allow the underground economy to flourish as long as they pay the 
required bribes to the interested parties (for example police, civil workers, regulatory 
authorities, etc). By contrast, this will be not possible in “cleaner” countries where the 
authorities will not tolerate illegal activities and where offering a bribe may even result in 
even bigger problems (such as criminal penalties). Therefore, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: “A higher level of corruption has a positive impact on the rate of informal 
entrepreneurship.” 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Dependent variables 
We use the entry density rate from the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshots 
(WBGES) as the dependent variable for formal entrepreneurship. This measure is 
calculated for 93 countries as the number of newly registered firms as a percentage of the 
population of a working-age in thousands. Furthermore, we show the results when using 
the entry per capita rate as an alternate dependent variable as a robustness test. This 
measure is calculated as the percentage of new companies registered over the total 
population in thousands.3 Data for both variables is collected by the World Bank through 
surveys of company registers as well as other governmental sources in each country. 
These measures are therefore specifically designed to capture formal entrepreneurship, 
by recording “any unit from the formal sector incorporated as a legal entity in a public 
register” (Klapper et al., 2007, p.4). 
Given its particular unregistered nature, studying informal entrepreneurship is always 
subject to great difficulties to find reliable and comprehensive data sources. We use the 
recently released Informal Entrepreneurship Index (IEI) calculated by Dau and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2014) and also used by Jimenez et al. (2015). The former authors calculate the 
index by “subtracting the ratio of new total (formal and informal) businesses as a 
percentage of the working-age population (using GEM data) minus the ratio of new 
formal businesses as a percentage of the working-age population (using WBGES data)” 
(Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra 2014, p.674).4 We include in our sample 43 countries for 
which at least two observations of the index5 as well as data for the other explanatory 
variables are available. 
Table 1 shows the countries included in each sample for the analysis of formal and 
informal entrepreneurship. Given data availability, we analyse the period 2002–2007 for 
both samples. 
Table 1 List of countries in the formal and informal entrepreneurship samples 
1. Albania 2. Algeria 3. Argentina* 
4. Armenia 5. Australia* 6. Austria* 
7. Azerbaijan 8. Bangladesh 9. Belgium* 
10. Bolivia 11. Bosnia Herzegovina 12. Botswana 
13. Brazil* 14. Bulgaria 15. Burkina Fasso 
16. Canada* 17. Chile* 18. Colombia* 
19. Congo 20. Costa Rica 21. Croatia* 
22. Czech Republic 23. Denmark* 24. Ecuador 
25. Egypt 26. El Salvador 27. Finland* 
28. France* 29. Georgia 31. Germany* 
32. Ghana 33. Greece* 34. Guatemala 
35. Haiti 36. Hong Kong* 37. Hungary* 
38. Iceland* 39. India* 40. Indonesia 
41. Ireland* 42. Israel* 43. Italy* 
44. Jamaica* 45. Japan* 46. Jordan 
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Table 1 List of countries in the formal and informal entrepreneurship samples (continued) 
47. Kazakhstan 48. Kenya 49. Kyrgyz Republic 
50. Latvia* 51. Lebanon 52. Lithuania 
53. Luxembourg 54. Madagascar 55. Malawi 
56. Malaysia 57. Mexico* 58. Moldova 
59. Morocco 60. Netherlands* 61. New Zealand* 
62. Nicaragua 63. Norway* 64. Oman 
65. Pakistan 66. Peru* 67. Philippines 
68. Poland* 69. Portugal* 70. Romania 
71. Russia* 72. Senegal 73. Serbia 
74. Singapur* 75. Slovak Republic 76. Slovenia* 
77. South Africa* 78. Spain* 79. Sri Lanka 
80. Sweden* 81. Switzerland* 82. Syria 
83. Tajikistan 84. Tanzania 85. Thailand* 
86. Tunisia 87. Turkey* 88. Uganda* 
89. Ukraine 90. UK* 91. USA* 
92. Uzbekistan 93. Yemen 93. Zambia 
Note: Countries with * are included in the informal entrepreneurship sample. 
3.2 Independent and control variables 
The Political Constraint Index (POLCONV) devised by Henisz (1998)6 is used to 
measure the degree of political discretion. This index measures regulatory discretion by 
taking into account the number of independent authorities with veto power in each 
country (for example executive, legislative, judiciary, and administrative). The score is 
later modified depending on possible alignments between powers, such that the model 
approaches the actual restrictions to which the government is subject. As the number of 
veto points increases, the likelihood of changing the status quo decreases since there is a 
drop in the range of public policies to implement that the different powers can agree 
upon. Conversely, where the authorities face lower constraints as a result of the absence, 
insufficiency or ineffectiveness of other independent political institutions, public policies 
are easily modified in the event of changes in political preferences. The index, which 
oscillates between values of 0 and 1, is designed so that higher scores imply greater 
regulatory stability and lower scores reflect greater discretion.  
The Corruption Perceptions Index prepared by Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org) is used to measure the level of corruption in a country. This 
index measures corruption perceived by experts from each country, and ranges between 
0, representing an absolutely corrupt state, and 10 for a corruption-free state (Pournarakis 
and Varsakelis, 2004; DiRienzo et al., 2007). 
Following previous works on entrepreneurship (Klapper and Love, 2011; Dutta et al., 
2013), control variables include macroeconomic indicators such as the logarithm of GDP 
per capita, the growth of GDP and the logarithm of inward foreign direct investment.  
Ex-ante, we expect that a greater amount of resources facilitates the creation of new 
companies, and higher growth rates offer a greater number of investment opportunities. 
Regarding inward foreign direct investment, its impact on entrepreneurship may be 
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negative as the level of competition increases in the market, but also new foreign 
companies can revitalise associated sectors (suppliers and/or customers), thus exerting a 
positive impact on firm creation. A series of year dummy values are included to control 
for the impact of historical events. Finally, unobserved country-specific factors are 
controlled by using panel models that account for the country. In the robustness tests we 
include a number of additional control variables such as gross and net educational 
enrolment rates (secondary or tertiary), whether the country is developed or developing 
and dummy variables to control for regional effects.  
The sources consulted were Henisz (1998), Transparency International, the World 
Bank and UNCTAD. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent, 
independent and control variables included in the model. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Average Standard Deviation Min. Max. 
Entry density 2.476 3.535 .001 27.033 
Informal entrepreneurship 3.431 3.329 0 17.96 
POLCONV .542 .284 0 .9 
Corruption 4.591 2.393 .4 10 
Per Capita GDP 5.55 .70 4.144 6.954 
GDP growth 4.41 3.403 –18 34.5 
Inward FDI 6.092 29.729 –15.713 564.933 
3.3 Model 
We rely on the statistical technique of cross-sectional time series to appropriately take 
into account the longitudinal nature of the sample. Following the recommendation of 
Greene (2000) and Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra (2014), a Generalised Least Squares (GLS) 
estimation with corrections for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation was conducted.  
As is standard practice in the literature (Bevan and Estrin, 2004), lags of one year 
were taken for all the explanatory variables of the models (both independent and control 
variables) in order to analyse their impact in the following year on the dependent 
variable. By following this procedure we not only take into account the time that 
institutions take to affect entrepreneurship (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009), but also reduce 
any potential problem of simultaneity bias. 
Therefore, our empirical analysis is based on the estimation of the following main 
model: 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (formal or informal)t = γ0 + γ1 POLITICAL 
CONSTRAINTSt–1 + γ2 CORRUPTIONt–1 + γ3 GDP per CÁPITAt–1  
+ γ4 GDP GROWTHt–1 + γ5 INWARD FDIt–1 + εij 
3.4 Multicollinearity diagnosis 
Table 3 offers the matrix of correlation coefficients and the Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIFs) for the independent and control variables. As it can be observed, all values are 
below the limit of 10 recommended by Neter et al. (1985), Kennedy (1992) and 
Studenmund (1992), and even the stricter limit of 5.3 proposed by Hair et al. (1999), 
which serves to affirm that there are no serious problems of multicollinearity. 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix and VIFS 
 1 2 3 4 5 VIFs 
1. POLCONV 1     1.34 
2. Corruption .481 1    3.98 
3. Per Capita GDP .463 .454 1   3.87 
4. GDP growth –.184 –.220 –.195 1  1.10 
5. Inward FDI .046 .137 .133 .068 1 1.03 
4 Results and discussion 
Table 4 shows the results obtained when the entry density rate for formal 
entrepreneurship (“a” models) and the first estimation of the IEI for informal 
entrepreneurship (“b” models) are taken as the dependent variables in the models. The 
first column shows the model including the control variables only. Then political 
discretion and corruption are each incorporated in turn. Finally, both variables are 
simultaneously included in the same model. 
In the case of formal entrepreneurship, the results in models 2a and 4a show that the 
POLCONV variable has a positive and significant coefficient. Since the index is devised 
so that lower scores reflect countries with a greater political discretion and vice versa, 
this result implies that political discretion exerts a negative impact on the creation of 
formal enterprises. Therefore hypothesis H1 is supported. Similarly, the results in models 
3a and 4a also show a positive and significant coefficient for the corruption variable. 
Since this index is also constructed so that lower scores reflect a higher level of 
corruption, this result denotes that corruption exerts a negative impact on the creation of 
formal enterprises. Therefore hypothesis H2 is also supported. Regarding informal 
entrepreneurship, models 2b and 4b show a non-significant coefficient for the political 
discretion variable. H3 is, therefore, not supported. Models 3b and 4b show a positive 
and significant coefficient for the corruption index. This means that, contrary to what it is 
was anticipated in H4, corruption discourages the creation of informal firms too. 
To test the validity of the model we followed Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra (2014) and 
performed a Wald test. The coefficient is highly significant in all models, confirming that 
the inclusion of the explanatory variables leads to a statistically significant improvement 
in the fit of the model (Chi-Square = 821.82*** in the full formal entrepreneurship model 
and 62.52*** in the informal entrepreneurship one).  
According to the previously described results, it can be affirmed that political 
discretion has emerged as a critical factor for formal entrepreneurship. Fewer restrictions 
to the discretional and opportunistic behaviour of the governments make entrepreneurs 
not trust the policies and commitments adopted by the government, increasing 
uncertainty and risks for formal entrepreneurial activities. It is therefore essential that if a 
country desires to foster entrepreneurship and to increase its rates of firm creation, then it 
must ensure the fulfilment of contracts, promote the stability and predictability of 
policies (Levie and Autio, 2008) and the protection of property rights (Aidis et al., 2010; 
Estrin et al., 2013). Furthermore, the government must strive to gain credibility even if 
this involves limiting its own ability to manoeuvre and tolerating the existence of 
independent political powers. As Anokhin and Schulze (2009, p.466) underline, 
“institutionalized trust plays a key role in creating an institutional context in which 
entrepreneurship and innovation can flourish”.  
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The impact of political discretion on informal entrepreneurship is ambiguous. While we 
expected a positive impact as a result of entrepreneurs choosing not to formalise their 
ventures to avoid being subject to the discretionary power of authorities and as a strategy 
of last resort, it may also be the case that the risk of expropriation affects not only formal 
but also informal entrepreneurial activities. As an anecdotal example, we could mention 
the events in Tunisia that preceded the Arab Spring that started in 2010. Mohamed 
Bouazizi, a young informal entrepreneur making a living and supporting a family of eight 
people with just a wheelbarrow of produce, decided to burn himself as a protest against 
the government after his wares were confiscated. These actions fuelled the protests  
that eventually overturned the government of former President Ben Ali and ignited  
the turmoil in several other countries in the region. In addition, higher political discretion 
may also indirectly affect informal firms by increasing the risk of unilateral 
modifications of key policy issues that crucially hurt suppliers and/or clients. 
Our results also emphasise corruption as a factor with a negative effect on the 
creation of not only formal but also informal enterprises. The higher costs and 
uncertainty about the profit appropriation in highly corrupted countries discourage 
potential formal entrepreneurs from starting their business project (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009; Estrin et al., 2013). These higher costs also affect informal entrepreneurs who, 
despite not formalising their ventures, may be forced to use bribes to ensure their survival 
by being away from the officers’ radar. Corruption therefore reduces the appeal of all 
types of entrepreneurship as some entrepreneurs may be unwilling to engage in such a 
behaviour (Aidis et al., 2010) and it reduces growth aspirations (Vorley and Williams, 
2015). It also puts new ventures at a disadvantage compared to established incumbents 
(Estrin et al., 2013). Yet, it does not offer guarantees that the agreed conditions will be 
fulfilled (Méon and Weill, 2010). 
Regarding the control variables, the results show that GDP per capita has as expected 
a positive effect on formal entrepreneurship, which demonstrates that a greater amount of 
resources facilitates the creation of formal enterprises. Meanwhile, the impact of GDP 
per capita and GDP growth on informal entrepreneurship is negative, which indicates  
that the lack of resources and economic opportunities can drive entrepreneurs into 
keeping their business not formalised in order to avoid requirements and bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, inward foreign direct investment also has a positive impact on formal 
entrepreneurship due to the revitalising effect that foreign companies can bring into 
certain industries and their related sectors. 
4.1 Alternative explanations and robustness tests. 
We conducted extensive additional analyses to check the robustness of the results to 
alternative explanations.7 First, there is an extensive literature on the relationship 
between corruption and the shadow economy. For instance, Choi and Thum (2005), 
Dreher et al. (2009) and Dreher and Schneider (2010) show that corruption and the 
underground sector influence one another. That raises the question of a potential reverse 
causality so that the informal economy exerts an influence on corruption. To address this 
issue, we first need to recall that while informal entrepreneurship is a component of the 
informal economy, the latter is a broader concept encompassing multiple dimensions. In 
fact, a country can have low levels of informal entrepreneurship despite the existence of a 
large informal economy, for the simple reason that there might already be many informal 
companies in existence. Although studying all the determinants of the informal sector is 
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beyond the scope of this paper, as it would require data and variables that, given their 
informal nature, are not always easy to collect, we can try to minimise the likelihood of 
reverse causality in our models. To do so, our explanatory variables are lagged one  
year, so we can assess their impact in the subsequent year, thereby reducing the  
potential problem of simultaneity (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). We also performed the 
analyses using a lag of two years instead of one, and obtained similar results.8 In 
addition, we checked whether corruption (and political discretion) has a different impact 
on entrepreneurship depending on the level of development of the country. To do so, we 
entered a dummy variable distinguishing between developed and developing countries 
according to the UNCTAD classification. The results are largely consistent with those of 
the main models. We also split the sample according to the level of development to run 
different models for each sub-sample. While the results are quite similar, we warn that 
these results must be interpreted with caution given the reduced size of the sub-samples.  
Second, Tonoyan et al. (2010) found that entrepreneurs will engage in corruption if 
banks and other money lenders are perceived as bureaucratic and less business-friendly. 
While again studying the determinants of corruption is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we added to the models the number of days required to start a new business to account 
for the business-friendliness of the home country environment. While the size of the 
formal and informal entrepreneurship samples drops a little, the results confirm again the 
same hypotheses and, interestingly, show that the number of days required to start a new 
business has no significant impact on formal entrepreneurship but it is a very significant 
predictor of informal entrepreneurship (p < 0.001). Thus, longer procedures to start a new 
business reflect a more unfriendly environment for the creation of firms, which leads 
some entrepreneurs to opt for a quicker and simpler option by not registering their 
ventures. 
As additional robustness tests, we used the per capita entry rate as an alternate 
dependent variable for formal entrepreneurship. The results, however, do not differ 
substantially from those described above and verify that both greater political discretion 
and a higher level of corruption exert a significant and negative impact on the creation of 
formal enterprises. In addition, we replaced the Index of Corruption from Transparency 
International with the corruption measure included in the World Governance Indicators 
(Control of Corruption). The results do not present significant changes compared to the 
main models.9  
We also tested models including additional control variables. First, we added 
variables related to human capital. Specifically, we alternatively included the rates of 
gross secondary and tertiary education from the World Development Indicators database 
of the World Bank. Unfortunately, these variables are not available for all the countries 
in the samples so we chose to use these models for robustness purposes only.  
The results obtained remain unchanged across all the model specifications. Regarding the 
educational variables, and consistent with the results previously obtained in the literature 
(Jimenez et al., 2015), both secondary and tertiary education show a consistent positive 
and significant impact on formal entrepreneurship, while only tertiary education exercise 
a significant negative impact on informal entrepreneurship.  
We also controlled for the possible existence of effects arising from the respective 
regions where the countries are located. Thus, mutually exclusive dichotomous variables 
were introduced into the models in order to control for the effect of belonging to the 
European Union, North America, Latin America, Asia, Africa, or the Middle East 
(keeping the rest of the world as reference category). Nevertheless, the results obtained 
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do not present significant changes compared to those presented previously. Finally, we 
ran the models using the same subsample of observations for formal and informal 
entrepreneurship and confirmed that results remain basically unchanged. 
5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of two relatively under-studied 
institutional variables, political discretion and corruption, on formal and informal 
entrepreneurship. To this end we analyse the influence that the POLCONV political 
constraints index and the Corruption Perceptions Index exert on the rates of formal and 
informal firm creation. The results confirm that both political discretion and corruption 
have a negative effect on the rates of formal entrepreneurship. This is due to the low 
credibility of the government’s policies and commitments when there is a high political 
discretion, as well as the higher costs and the difficulty of enforcing the other party to 
fulfil the agreement in the case of corruption. Both circumstances increase the 
uncertainty and transaction costs that potential entrepreneurs face, thus discouraging the 
creation of new firms.  
In the case of informal entrepreneurship, we found no significant effect for political 
discretion. We interpret this finding as the result of two contradicting forces. On the  
one hand, when political discretion is high, entrepreneurs may resort to informal 
entrepreneurship to circumvent being subject to regulations. On the other hand, the risk 
of expropriation or policy modification may also affect informal enterprises either 
directly or in a more indirect way by hurting suppliers and/or clients. By contrast, the 
creation of informal firms decreases as the level of corruption in the country becomes 
greater. This result demonstrates that the additional costs and uncertainty that a corrupted 
system imposes on firms affect both types of entrepreneurship.  
Regarding the control variables, the results confirm that a greater amount of available 
resources facilitates the creation of new formal enterprises. Resource scarcity and  
lower economic growth, however, encourage entrepreneurs to opt for informal firms. 
Moreover, formal entrepreneurship is also affected positively by the revitalising impact 
that direct investment from abroad has on some sectors.  
We believe that important implications can be extracted from our results  
that highlight the contributions of this study. First, with regard to the academic 
implications, we contribute to the body of literature on the institutional determinants of 
entrepreneurship by demonstrating that the quality of the institutional environment plays 
a key role in the creation of businesses, with different effects on the formal and informal 
sectors. While corruption has been analysed in previous studies, we show that political 
discretion, a common concept in the non-market strategy literature, also exerts a relevant 
impact on entrepreneurship. Specifically, these two types of extractive institutions 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2002) have a significant effect on firm creation 
as a result of the increase in costs and risks that comes from the greater uncertainty that 
they impose on entrepreneurial activities. 
By disentangling the distinct effect that political discretion and corruption have on 
formal as well as informal entrepreneurship, this study provides a granular understanding 
of the causal patterns of different types of entrepreneurial activities. This highlights the 
need for future research to take into account the different natures of these two types  
of entrepreneurship, both in terms of their determinants and their consequences and 
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repercussions (Jimenez et al., 2015). By using a cross-country sample, the study provides 
more generalisable results from the ones obtained from a single country. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of informal entrepreneurship, a field where researchers 
usually face the challenge of finding reliable measures. 
Second, as implication for policy-makers who wish to encourage the creation of new 
formal enterprises, these results underscore the need to create an environment where 
institutions of private property (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2002) are 
protected and enhanced in order to offer guarantees to potential entrepreneurs. This 
includes ensuring the protection of investors, providing a relatively stable and predictable 
regulatory framework and increasing the credibility of the government by adopting a 
political system that avoids discretionary and opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, it is 
also necessary to combat corruption. The negative impact of corruption extends not only 
to formal but also informal firms, so policy-makers should make the reduction of 
corruption a priority if they want to foster entrepreneurship and enjoy its numerous 
advantages related to employment creation, innovation, economic growth and 
development (Agarwal et al., 2007; Baumol, 2004; Baumol and Strom, 2007; Grilo and 
Thurik, 2005; Carsroud and Cucculelli, 2014). 
Third, as practical implications for entrepreneurs, this study highlights the importance 
of political discretion and corruption in business creation through their impact on 
uncertainty and on the risk of governmental opportunistic behaviour. It is therefore 
critical that entrepreneurs not only appropriately assess the risks arising from the market 
but also the non-market environment (Hillman et al., 2004; Doh et al., 2012), and that 
they include specific actions to analyse, understand and, if possible, interact effectively 
with political and regulatory authorities. 
Lastly, it should be recognised that this work is subject to some limitations. First, and 
due to the difficulties to collect reliable data about informal activities, the sample 
analysed for informal entrepreneurship is significantly smaller than the sample for formal 
entrepreneurship. While this limitation is mitigated by the fact that we obtained 
consistent results when we performed a robustness test for formal entrepreneurship using 
the same sample available for informal entrepreneurship, future studies could try to 
collect data of a larger number of countries whenever reliable sources become available. 
Second, this work only considers whether the firm created is formalised or not, despite 
the fact that formal firms can perform informal activities as well. Subsequent studies 
could expand this line of research by considering the informal activities performed by 
formal firms and the formal activities performed by informal firms. Third, our study 
analyses the impact of political discretion and corruption on a single specific aspect of 
entrepreneurship that is rates of firm creation. Disentangling the impact of institutional 
quality on other aspects related to formal and informal entrepreneurship represents, in our 
view, a very promising line of future research. Finally, in this paper we study the impact 
of institutional quality on formal and informal entrepreneurship, but we acknowledge that 
the reverse relationships represent challenging and interesting future avenues for 
research. While we have taken various measures to minimise the potential reverse 
causality, there is no doubt that shedding light on the role of the formal and informal 
sector on the levels of corruption and political discretion of the country can widen  
our understanding of the complex interrelationships between entrepreneurship and 
institutional quality. 
In conclusion, institutions matter for entrepreneurship, both formal and informal. 
Corruption and political discretion have an expected, negative impact on formal 
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entrepreneurship. Corruption is negative to both formal and informal entrepreneurship. 
But the impact of political discretion on informal entrepreneurship is veiled by 
countervailing forces, leading to no significant impact in either direction. 
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Notes 
1 A vice-president at Enron International claimed that governments tend to use indirect methods 
instead of direct expropriations: “They are more likely to find ways to blame the Project 
sponsor, withhold or cancel key permits of approvals, and so forth, resulting in contract 
frustration rather than expropriation… The loss can even be worse than with (classical) 
expropriation, because it can be difficult or impossible for a project sponsor to obtain 
compensation for a contract frustration loss” (Powers, 1998, pp.127–128). 
2 Examples of illegitimate activities are drug trafficking or human smuggling. See Webb et al. 
(2009) for further discussion about informal and illegitimate entrepreneurship. 
3 Available for 77 of the countries in the sample. 
4 See Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra (2014) for a more detailed description of the procedure to 
calculate this measure and its validation. 
5 The Informal Entrepreneurship index covers 66 countries with at least one observation. 
However, the statistical technique Generalised Least Square (GLS) panel model requires at 
least two year of data for a country to be included in the analysis. 
6 The Political Constraint Index is available to download from Professor Henisz’s personal 
website https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1327 
7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention into these issues. 
8 Results for all the robustness tests are available from the authors upon request. 
9 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
